DOCUMENT RESUME

ED 142 463 SO 010 146

AUTHOR	Leventhal, Gerald S.
TITLE	What Should Be Done with Equity Theory? New Approaches to the Study of Fairness in Social Relationships.
SPONS AGENCY	National Science Foundation, Washington, D.C.
PUB DATE	Sep 76
GRANT	GS-3171
NOTE	52p.; To appear as a chapter in Gergen, K.J., Ed., And Others, "Social Exchange Theory," John Wiley, 1977
AVAILABLE FROM	Dr. Gerald S. Leventhal, Department of Psychology, Wayne State University, Detroit, Michigan 48202 (free)
EDRS PRICE	MF-$0.83 Plus Postage. HC Not Available from EDRS.
DESCRIPTORS	Behavior Theories; *Evaluation Criteria; Human Relations; *Justice; Models; *Rewards; Social Attitudes; Social Behavior; Social Influences; Social Problems; Social Psychology; Social Reinforcement; *Social Science Research; *Social Systems; Sociocultural Patterns; Theories
IDENTIFIERS	*Equity Theory

ABSTRACT

This paper presents an alternative to the predominant equity theory for studying the concept of fairness in social relationships. According to the equity theory, or merit principle, fairness in social relationships occurs when rewards, punishments, and resources are allocated in proportion to one's input or contributions. The basic problems of this theory are that it employs a unidimensional concept of fairness and that it emphasizes only the fairness of distribution, ignoring the fairness of procedure. In contrast, the alternative to this theory is based on two justice rules, the distributional and the procedural. Distribution rules follow certain criteria: the individual's contributions, his needs, and the equality theory. These criteria are considered relative to the individual's role within the particular setting or social system. A justice judgment sequence estimates the individual's deservingness based on each rule. Final judgments evolve from a rule-combination equation. Preceding the final distribution of reward, a cognitive map of the allocative process is constructed. Fairness is judged in terms of the procedure's consistency, prevention of personal bias, and its representativeness of important subgroups. Opportunities to apply this concept of fairness exist in field studies of censorship, participatory decision making, equal opportunity, and representativeness of social institutions. (KC)

Documents acquired by ERIC include many informal unpublished materials not available from other sources. ERIC makes every effort to obtain the best copy available. Nevertheless, items of marginal reproducibility are often encountered and this affects the quality of the microfiche and hardcopy reproductions ERIC makes available via the ERIC Document Reproduction Service (EDRS). EDRS is not responsible for the quality of the original document. Reproductions supplied by EDRS are the best that can be made from the original.

Best Copy Available

PERMISSION TO REPRODUCE THIS COPYRIGHTED MATERIAL BY MICROFICHE ONLY HAS BEEN GRANTED BY
Gerald Leventhal
TO ERIC AND ORGANIZATIONS OPERATING UNDER AGREEMENTS WITH THE NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF EDUCATION. FURTHER REPRODUCTION OUTSIDE THE ERIC SYSTEM REQUIRES PERMISSION OF THE COPYRIGHT OWNER.

ED142463

1972

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION & WELFARE
NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF EDUCATION

THIS DOCUMENT HAS BEEN REPRODUCED EXACTLY AS RECEIVED FROM THE PERSON OR ORGANIZATION ORIGINATING IT. POINTS OF VIEW OR OPINIONS STATED DO NOT NECESSARILY REPRESENT OFFICIAL NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF EDUCATION POSITION OR POLICY

WHAT SHOULD BE DONE WITH EQUITY THEORY? NEW APPROACHES TO THE STUDY OF FAIRNESS IN SOCIAL RELATIONSHIPS

Gerald S. Leventhal
Wayne State University

I. Introduction

A. The Problem of Allocation

B. Issues in Equity Theory

II. A Multidimensional Approach to Distributive Fairness

A. The Unidimensional Approach of Equity Theory

B. The Multidimensional Approach of Justice Judgment Theory

C. Judgments of Distributive Fairness

III. The Perception of Procedural Fairness

A. Procedural Fairness Defined

B. Structural Components in Cognitive Maps of the Allocative Process

C. Justice Rules for Evaluating Procedural Fairness

D. The Relative Weight of Procedural Rules

IV. The Impact of Perceived Fairness on Behavior

A. The Importance of Fairness

B. Activation of the Justice Judgment Sequence

C. Concern for Fairness and Other Causes of "Fair" Behavior

V. Summary

This chapter is scheduled to appear in a book on "Social Exchange Theory" edited by K.J. Gergen, M.S. Greenberg, & R.H. Willis, to be published by John Wiley in 1977.

Preparation of the chapter was supported by Grant GS-3171 from the National Science Foundation. The author is indebted to Jurgis Karuza and Sheldon Alexander for their many valuable comments.

SP 010 146

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

WHAT SHOULD BE DONE WITH EQUITY THEORY? NEW APPROACHES TO THE STUDY OF FAIRNESS IN SOCIAL RELATIONSHIPS

Gerald Leventhal
Wayne State University

I. Introduction

A. The Problem of Allocation

The distribution of rewards and resources is a universal phenomenon that occurs in social systems of all sizes, from small groups to whole societies (Parsons, 1951; Parsons, Shils & Olds, 1951). All groups, organizations, and societies deal with the question of allocating rewards, punishments, and resources. The manner in which a social system deals with these issues has great impact on its effectiveness, and on the satisfaction of its members. For these reasons, it is not surprising that social scientists from many disciplines, political scientists, economists, sociologists, and psychologists, have been concerned with the problem of allocation (e.g., Pondy, 1970; Jones & Kaufman, 1974; Leventhal, 1976a).

In social psychology and sociology, exchange theorists such as Thibaut and Kelley (1959), Homans (1974), and Blau (1964) have analyzed reward distribution and its effects. In addition, there has been considerable research on the perceived fairness of distributions of reward and punishment, and on the effect of violating perceived fairness. Much of this research has been guided by equity theory. According to the theory, human beings believe that rewards and punishments should be distributed in accordance with recipients' inputs or contributions (Adams, 1963,1965; Homans, 1974). From this simple conception, equity theory has generated several distinct lines of research (Adams & Freedman, 1976; Goodman & Friedman, 1971; Pritchard, 1969; Leventhal, 1976a; Walster, Berscheid, & Walster, 1973). However, for several reasons, the

theory has outgrown its usefulness and should be replaced by a more comprehensive formulation. Accordingly, this paper sets forth in detail a clear alternative to the equity theory approach. In so doing, several problems with equity theory are discussed and an attempt it made to answer the question: What should be done with equity theory?

B. Issues in Equity Theory

Three major problems with equity theory are considered. The first problem is that equity theory employs a unidimensional rather than multidimensional conception of fairness. The theory conceptualizes perceived justice solely in terms of a merit principle. The second problem is that equity theory considers only the final distribution of reward. The procedures which generate that distribution are not examined. The focus is on fair distribution. Problems of fair procedure are ignored. The third problem is that equity theory tends to exaggerate the importance of fairness in social relationships. Concern for justice is only one motivational force among many that influences social perception and behavior, and it may often be a weaker force than others.

Other approaches to the study of fairness in social exchange share some of these problems with equity theory. No single approach has solved them all. However, because equity theory is so prominent, it is the focus of this critique.

II. A Multidimensional Approach to Distributive Fairness

A. The Unidimensional Approach of Equity Theory

Equity theory employs a unidimensional concept of justice. The theory assumes that an individual judges the fairness of his own or others' rewards solely in terms of a merit principle. Fairness exists when rewards are in

proportion to contributions. Undoubtedly, the theory is correct in assuming that an individual's perception of fairness is strongly affected by a contributions rule which dictates that persons with greater contributions should receive higher outcomes. However, equity theory ignores the possible role of other standards of justice that influence perception of distributive fairness. In contrast, a number of theorists have recognized the need for a multidimensional concept of distributive fairness (e.g., Deutsch, 1975; Komorita & Chertkoff, 1973; Lerner, 1974a; Leventhal, 1976a,b; Pruitt, 1972; Sampson, 1969). For example, the multidimensional approach of the justice judgment model (Leventhal, 1976b) assumes than an individual's judgments of fairness may be based, not only on the contributions rule, but also on a needs rule which dictates that persons with greater need should receive higher outcomes, or an equality rule which dictates that everyone should receive similar outcomes regardless of needs or contributions.

Terminology. Before examining the multidimensional approach to perceived fairness, it is necessary to consider the definition of the term equity. Most equity theory researchers have equated the term with a type of justice based on merit or contributions. But this definition is much narrower than that employed in everyday language. Webster's Third New International Dictionary defines the term equity as "a free and reasonable conformity to accept standards of natural right, law, and justice without prejudice, favoritism, or fraud and without rigor entailing undue hardship." This definition is much broader than that typically preferred by equity researchers. The dictionary definition of equity encompasses a whole panoply of justice standards, not just one. Only a few social psychologists (e.g., Pruitt, 1972) have favored such a broad use of the term. Close inspection of the writings of equity theorists suggests they do sometimes use the term in a broad sense, as well as the narrow.

However, they do not differentiate between the two usages and may casually slide from one to the other Perhaps this tendency is not surprising given the theory's use of a unidimensional concept of justice based on merit. In the present paper, because of this ambiguity, the practice shall be to avoid using the term equity. Instead, the terms fairness and justice are used to refer to equity in the general sense defined by Webster's. The term contributions rule refers to equity in the more narrow sense of justice that is based on a matching of rewards to contributions. The term distributive fairness is also used frequently in these pages. The phrase refers to judgments of fair distribution, irrespective of whether the criterion of justice is based on needs, equality, contributions, or a combination of these factors.

3. The Multidimensional Approach of Justice Judgment Theory

It has been noted that equity theory conceptualizes perceived fairness as a single dimension that defines justice in terms of the proprtionality between contributions and rewards. The justice judgment model (Leventhal, 1976b) employs a multidimensional conception of justice that poses a clear alternative to equity theory. Justice judgment theory assumes than an individual's perception of fairness is based on justice rules. In the present paper, which presents a revised and expanded form of the theory, a justice rule is defined as an individual's belief that a distribution of outcomes, or procedure for distributing outcomes, is fair and appropriate when it satisfies certain criteria. This definition presupposes two categories of justice rules, namely, distribution rules and procedural rules. A distribution rule is defined as the individual's belief that it is fair and appropriate when rewards, punishments, or resources are distributed in accordance with certain criteria. A specific criterion might require the matching of rewards to contributions, or matching rewards to needs.

or dividing rewards equally. Thus, a contributions rule, needs rule, and equality rule are among the major distributive rules that can influence an individual's perception of distributive fairness.

Procedural rules constitute the second catagory of justice rules. A procedural rule is defined as an individual's belief that allocative procedures which satisfy certain criteria are fair and appropriate. Unfortunately, there are few studies of the impact of procedural factors on perceived fairness. Relatively little is known about an individual's evaluation of procedural components of the social system that regulate the allocative process. Theoretical proposals about the specific criteria that define rules of fair procedure must therefore be quite speculative. Nevertheless, later in this paper, six rules of fair procedure will be proposed and discussed. However, for the moment, the problem of procedural fairness is set aside, and the issue of distributive fairness is the main concern.

C. Judgments of Distributive Fairness

A major tenet of the justice judgment model is that an individual applies distribution rules selectively and follows different rules at different times. Thus, the individual's basic criteria for evaluating fairness may change with circumstances. In some situations, he or she may believe that one distribution rule is more relevant than others, in which case that rule has greater impact on the evaluation of distributive fairness.

The model assumes a four-stage justice judgment sequence by which an individual evaluates the fairness of his own or others' rewards and punishments. As described below, the four stages are weighting, preliminary estimation, rule combination, and outcome evaluation.

1. Weighting. In the weighting stage of the justice judgment sequence, the individual decides which distribution rules are applicable and the relative importance of the rules. Rules of greater importance are assigned higher weight in the judgment sequence and have greater impact on the perception of fairness.

2. Preliminary Estimation. In the preliminary estimation stage, the individual estimates the amount and type of outcomes that receivers deserve based on each applicable rule. It is assumed that an individual uses a separate information-processing subroutine (Anderson, 1974) for each rule to estimate the receiver's deservingness based on that rule. Consequently, if several rules have been assigned high weight, several information-processing subroutines will operate in parallel. Except in young children, the perceptual-cognitive skills involved in such judgments are probably well-practiced and automatic. Consequently, an individual can make several nearly simultaneous estimates of deservingness based on different distribution rules.

3. Rule Combination. In the rule-combination stage of the justice judgment sequence, the individual combines the several preliminary estimates to arrive at a final judgment of the receiver's deservingness. The events in this stage are summarized by the following rule-combination equation:

$$\text{Deserved outcomes} = w_c\, D_{\text{by contributions}} + w_n\, D_{\text{by needs}} + w_e\, D_{\text{by equality}} + w_o\, D_{\text{by other rules}}.$$

In this equation, the letter w stands for the word weight and the letter D stands for the word deservingness. The terms w_c, w_n, w_e and w_o represent, respectively, the weights of the contributions rule, needs rule, equality rule, and any other distribution rule that may influence the individual's perception of a recipient's deservingness. The terms $D_{\text{by contributions}}$, $D_{\text{by needs}}$, $D_{\text{by equality}}$, and $D_{\text{by other rules}}$ represent, respectively, an individual's preliminary estimates of recipients' deservingness based on the contributions rule, needs rule, equality rule, and any other distribution rules that influence his or her judgments of distributive fairness. The rule-combination equation states that the relative

impact of each preliminary estimate on a perceiver's judgments of deservingness depends on the relative weight of the justice rules.

Distribution rules with similar weight may have contradictory implications. For example, the needs rule and contributions rule would dictate opposite distributions of reward in the case of a recipient with high need and low contributions. An individual usually deals with such contradictions by compromising between the opposed rules. A recipient with high need and low contributions may be evaluated as average in deservingness. Of course, distribution rules are not always contradictory. For example, the needs rule and contributions rule would dictate similar distributions of reward in the case of a recipient who is high in both contributions and need, or low in both respects.

A perceiver often evaluates the deservingness of several recipients at a time. In some cases, he or she may judge them collectively and estimate the deservingness of an entire group of persons. In other cases, the individual uses several parallel versions of the rule-combination equation, one for each recipient whose deservingness is under evaluation (Leventhal, 1976b).

4. Outcome Evaluation. In the outcome-evaluation stage, the final stage of the justice judgment sequence, the individual assesses the fairness of the receiver's outcomes. The individual has estimated what receivers ought to get and can now determine whether their actual (or potential) rewards and punishments are in line with what they deserve.

New Directions for Research. The justice judgment model suggests several new directions for research on distributive fairness. First, it calls for studies of factors that determine the relative weight of different distribution rules. Second, it calls for careful study of the attribution processes by which perceivers estimate deservingness based on each rule. Third, the model calls for studies that examine the role of additional distribution rules. The final

term of the rule-combination equation, $w_o D_{\text{by other rules}}$, emphasizes that other justice rules besides the contributions, needs, and equality rules may have important effects on the perception of distibutive fairness. The following sections consider these new directions for research.

The Weight of Justice Rules. The study of determinants of the relative weight of justice rules is one of the most important research questions posed by the multidimensional analysis of perceived fairness. An extensive review of past research related to the weight of distribution rules has been presented in an earlier paper (Leventhal, 1976b). Interested readers will find much relevant theory and research in that paper which is not considered here. The present paper focuses on new evidence generated by the justice judgment model.

Past research suggests that self-interest and conformity are major determinants of rule weight. An individual assigns higher weight to distribution rules that maximize his own rewards, and distribution rules favored by other persons or legitimate authorities (Leventhal, 1976a,b). Moreover, in any specific interaction setting, the individual's weighting of distribution rules is strongly influenced by beliefs about the purpose for which that setting was created and the functions it serves for the larger social system. For example, in interaction settings in which productivity and task achievement are the primary concern, the individual is likely to assign high weight to the contributions rule. A rule of rewarding in accordance with task contributions is likely to be followed. In settings in which good interpersonal relations and group solidarity are the primary concern, the individual is likely to assign high weight to the equality rule. A rule of dividing rewards equally is likely to be followed. And, in settings in which the welfare of others is the primary concern, the individual is likely to assign high weight to the needs rule. A rule of rewarding in accordance with needs is likely to be followed. Another

determinant of the individual's weighting of justice rules is role demands placed upon him in specific interaction settings. The requirements of social roles dispose an individual to favor some distribution rules more than others.

Results from a study by Karuza and Leventhal (1976) confirm these suggestions. The research examines the relative impact of the needs rule and contributions rule on allocation decisions. The subjects took part in an alleged study of college students' charitable behavior that was financed by a large research organization. Each subject was provided with several dollars that was to be divided among four (ficticious) South American children whose cases were drawn from the files of the World Children Foundation. The recipients' contributions were manipulated by describing two of the children as above average in school performance and two as average. The recipients' needs were manipulated by describing their nutritional status. Two were described as slightly needy and two as highly needy. The role demands placed upon the subject were also manipulated. Some subjects were shown a letter from the World Children Foundation that stated the organization's policy was to reduce human suffering. Other subjects were shown a slightly different version of the letter that stated the organization's policy was to aid only those children who could make useful contributions to their country.

From the subjects' vantage point, a fundamental purpose of the interaction setting was to provide help for needy children. Consequently, all subjects were expected to assign relatively high weight to the needs rule and give substantially more money to the more needy children. This hypothesis was confirmed. In addition, the role demands placed on subjects by the letter from the World Children Foundation affected the weight they assigned to the contributions rule. When the letter stated that the Foundation's primary concern was to help chilren who could make useful contributions, the subjects gave substantially more

money to the children with better school performance. When the latter emphasized the goal of reducing human suffering, the difference in the children's school performance was ignored. The subjects assigned minimal weight to the contributions rule and gave as much money to poor performers as good performers.

A recent study by Lewis and Leventhal (in press) shows the effect of role demands on the relative weight of the contributions rule and equality rule. The subjects were 60 assistant prosecuting attorneys at a county prosecutor's office and their seven supervisors. The attorneys were asked to indicate their preference for merit versus across-the-board pay raises. They expressed their preference by indicating the proportion of available funds that they wished to distribute on a merit basis and the proportion they wished to distribute on an across-the-board basis. In terms of the justice judgment model, this dependent variable taps the relative weights of the contributions rule and needs rule. A marked difference was found between the preferences of the attorneys and their supervisors, with supervisors displaying a much stronger preference for merit raises. This finding is consistent with those obtained by Yuchtman (1973) in factories that produced boxes and containers. The results confirm the suggestion that role demands affect the weighting of distribution rules. Because supervisory roles demand high concern about maximizing productivity, supervisors are more likely than workers to assign high weight to the contributions rule and favor a merit pay system (Leventhal, 1976a,b).

Perceptual Attribution in the Justice Judgment Sequence. It has been suggested that, in the preliminary estimation stage of the justice judgment sequence, an individual uses a separate information-processing subroutine for each applicable distribution rule when estimating deservingness based on that rule. The individual makes several independent but parallel estimates of deservingness. An important question is whether the judgmental operations

associated with one distribution rule differ in form from those associated with other distribution rules. Existing research provides little information about this question because investigators have analyzed the information-processing subroutine for only one distribution rule, the contributions rule. In terms of the rule-combination equation, more is known about the judgmental process by which the term $D_{\text{by contributions}}$ is calculated than the process by which the terms $D_{\text{by needs}}$ or $D_{\text{by equality}}$ are calculated.

Equity theory (Adams, 1965; Anderson, 1974) suggests that one portion of the information-processing subroutine that an individual uses to calculate receivers' deservingness based on their contributions is as follows:

$$D_{\text{by contributions}} = \frac{O_{\text{units}}}{C_{\text{units}}} \times \text{total contribution.}$$

In this subroutine, the term total contribution represents an individual's perception of all relevant contributory behavior by the person whose deservingness is under evaluation. Within the term $O_{\text{units}}/C_{\text{units}}$, C_{units} stands for units of contribution, and O_{units} stands for matching units of outcome. $O_{\text{units}}/C_{\text{units}}$ represents an individual's overall estimate of a fair rate of exchange. The individual believes that, for each component (C_{unit}) of the receivers' total contribution, a certain outcome (O_{unit}) is deserved in exchange. The term $O_{\text{units}}/C_{\text{units}}$ represents the sum of these beliefs across all components of the receiver's total contribution. The equation parallels Anderson's (1974) restatement of the basic formula that Adams (1965) proposes as the core of equity theory. Leventhal (1976b) suggests that an individual who assigns high weight to the contributions rule uses this equation to estimate $D_{\text{by contributions}}$ and then inserts the estimate into the rule-combination equation for a final evaluation of the receiver's deservingness.

Before closing this section, a word is in order about the information-processing subroutines associated with the needs rule and other distribution rules.

Students of perceptual attribution have devoted much attention to factors that affect the perception and evaluation of one's own or other's performance contributions (e.g., Weiner, Frieze, Kukla, Reed, Rest, & Rosenbaum, 1971). Considerably less attention has been devoted to factors that affect the perception and evaluation of one's own or other's needs. Accordingly, there is need for studies that explore the structure of the information-processing subroutine by which subjects' judge needs and estimate deservingness based on needs. The same is true for other justice rules.

What Should Be Done With Equity Theory? The preceding discussion of information-processing subroutines answers a question posed at the beginning of this paper. The question was: What should be done with equity theory? The answer is that equity theory should be incorporated into a more comprehensive theoretical framework that takes a broader view of the problem of perceived justice in social relationships. The justice judgment model which, by virtue of its multidimensional approach is more comprehensive than equity theory, accomplishes this task by treating the basic equity theory eqaution as one component of a multistage sequence of interlocking and parallel judgments. The equation for estimating $D_{\text{by contributions}}$, which is a slightly modified version of the core equation of equity theory, is a component of the justice judgment sequence.

In this context, it may be useful to comment on a recent debate in the literature on equity theory. The debate concerns the appropriate mathematical structure of the core equation of equity theory, the equation that justice judgment theory treats as an information-processing subroutine for the contributi rule. A number of authors have discussed the precise form of this equation (e.g., Harris, 1976; Samuel, 1976a,b; Walster, 1975, 1976; Walster, Berscheid, & Walster, 1973; Zuckerman, 1975). The debate raises interesting

questions. However, while the debate has significance within the confines of equity theory, it seems less critical when viewed against the background of the many fundamental conceptual problems that equity theory has overlooked.

Other Justice Rules. To this point, the main focus has been the needs rule, contributions rule, and equality rule. A considerable amount is known about these distribution rules, but other rules also influence the perception of distributive fairness. Several theorists have discussed the nature of these additional rules, but there have been few studies of them.

At least five additional distribution rules have been identified that may affect an individual's perception of distributive fairness. First, it has been suggested there is a rule of justified self-interest which dictates that, in appropriate circumstances, it is fair for an individual to take as much for himself as possible (Lerner, 1971, 1974a). Second, it has been suggested there is a rule of adhering to commitments which dictates that fairness is violated unless persons receive that which has been promised to them (Leventhal, 1976a; Pruitt, 1971, 1972). Third, it has been suggested there is a legality rule which dictates that fairness is violated if the distribution of reward or punishment is inconsistent with existing laws and regulations (Berkowitz & Walker, 1967; Kaufmann, 1970; Lerner, 1974a).

These suggestions call for two types of studies. First, factors that affect the relative weight of these rules must be examined. For example, one might investigate conditions that lead an individual to disregard past promises or commitments and evaluate distributive fairness in other terms. Second, it is important to examine the consequences of conflict between these distribution rules and others. For example, one might investigate the effect of conflict between the needs rule and legality rule that occurs when existing laws prevent needy persons from improving their lot.

Two additional distribution rules remain to be discussed, the ownership rule and status rule. It is assumed there is an ownership rule which dictates it is fair for individuals to continue to possess rewards and resources that already belong to them, and unfair to take these resources from them. This rule is exemplified by the concepts of squatter's rights and private property. The basic tenet of the ownership rule is that the owner has the right to decide when and how his property shall be used. Ihinger (1975) has suggested that, in families, rules honoring private ownership play a significant role in minimizing conflict between siblings over toys and other possessions.

Of the distribution rules considered in this section, the status rule has probably received more explicit attention than the others. Both sociologists and social psychologists have discussed the operation of pressures toward status congruence, i.e., of a tendency to equilibrate people's rank on different dimensions of status (e.g., Berger, Zelditch, Anderson, & Cohen, 1972; Burnstein & Zajonc, 1965; Homans, 1974; Sampson, 1963, 1969). In the present framework, the status rule dictates it is fair when persons of high social rank receive higher outcomes than those of low social rank.

From the vantage point of equity theory, one might question the distinction between the status rule and contributions rule. Equity theory treats characteristics such as sex, ethnicity, and social position as inputs that merit appropriate outcomes. Furthermore, it might be argued that an individual's perceived social rank is usually so highly correlated with perceived contributions that the distinction between the two rules has no significance. However, the actual correlation between perceived

social status and perceived contributions is probably quite imperfect. Although persons of higher social position may often be seen as having higher contributions, there are many exceptions. There are cases in which individuals of high social status make low contributions (e.g., the prodigal son of a wealthy, established family), and cases in which individuals of low social status have high contributions (e.g., an uneducated immigrant who works hard and is successful in business). In such instances, the status rule and contributions rule are in direct conflict, and it is meaningful to distinguish between them.

Many questions remain unanswered about additional distribution rules and their role in the perception of distributive fairness. Such rules are an important aspect of multidimensional models of perceived justice and require further study.

III. The Perception of Procedural Fairness

A. Procedural Fairness Defined

Every group, organization, or society has procedures that regulate the distribution of rewards and resources. There is a network of regulatory procedures that guides the allocative process. The distribution of reward or punishment is only the final step in a sequence of events. However, equity theory and the concept of distributive fairness restrict the analysis of perceived justice to this last step in the allocative process. Perceived fairness is defined solely in terms of the distribution of reward. The social system which generates that distribution is not considered. No provision is made for an individual's internal conceptual representation of properties of the social system that regulates the allocative process. However, pioneering work by Thibaut, Walker, and their associates (Friedland, Thibaut, & Walker, 1973;

Thibaut, Friedland, & Walker, 1974; Thibaut, Walker, LaTour, & Houlden, 1974; Walker, LaTour, Lind, & Thibaut, 1974), and philosophical analyses of the problem of justice (e.g., Rawls, 1971), indicate that procedural aspects of the allocative process are important determinants of perceived fairness.

The concept of procedural fairness refers to an individual's perception of the fairness of procedural components of the social system that regulate the allocative process. The concept focuses on the individual's cognitive map of events that precede the distribution of reward, and the evaluation of those events. Perhaps the best way to introduce the concept of procedural fairness is to relate an incident that occurred shortly before this paper was written. My recall of the incident is based on a typed transcript that I prepared from memory several hours after the incident occurred. It involved a telephone call from a faculty member in another department whose request for a Faculty Research Award had just been turned down. He called me because I was the chairperson of the Behavioral-Social Sciences Subcommittee that had reviewed his proposal. This subcommittee was a part of a larger body, the Faculty Research Awards Committee, that evaluated approximately 150 proposals from faculty members requesting financial support for their research. The typical proposal requested four- to five-thousand dollars, and since the committee had only $132,000 at its disposal, some difficult choices had to be made.

In my conversation with the person whose proposal was turned down, I answered all questions truthfully but also tried to be friendly and supportive. At the outset, my caller spoke with an air of quiet anger and firmness. Who had chosen the members of the subcommittee, he asked, and why was there no one from his department on the committee, someone who might have understood his proposal more fully? I explained that I didn't know how the subcommittee

members were chosen, but pointed out that they came from a wide range of schools and disciplines. I said there was one member from the law school, one from the school of social work, one from the business school, one from the school of education, and two from the school of liberal arts. In the latter case, I explained, there were two representatives one from the economics department and one from psychology (myself), because liberal arts was larger than the other schools. I said that, in my judgment, an attempt had been made to include a broad and representative range of subcommittee members with diverse competencies and interests. I also emphasized that, in any one year, it was impossible to include on the subcommittee a representative from every one of the numerous departments that might have grant proposals reviewed by the Behavioral-Social Sciences Subcommittee.

In further remarks, I described the process by which our subcommittee had made its decisions. I noted that each of the six members had first made a private and independent evaluation of the 29 proposals we reviewed. We had held two meetings and, in the second of them, pooled our judgments and collectively ranked the proposals. It was emphasized that the proposals were discussed carefully, and that the entire process was carried out with a concern for accuracy. I also noted that, to my own surprise and that of other subcommittee members, there was a high degree of unanimity in the ranking of proposals. I added that we were only human and, in view of the fact that there wasn't enough money to fund all of the proposals that deserved support, we had done the best job we could under difficult circumstances.

Up to this point, I had said little about the subcommittee's actual evaluation of my caller's application. I had not yet told him he ranked 21st in a field of 29 applicants and that only the top eight had been funded. After communicating these facts, I gave a detailed explanation of our reaction to his proposal and noted that, while the proposal was interesting, we were troubled by the absence

of focused hypotheses and the failure to describe the precise nature of the research to be conducted. In short, I said, the proposal received a low rating because it was vague and unclear. Wouldn't it have been possible, my caller asked, to have contacted him for further clarification? I stated that such a procedure would create serious difficulties because we had to treat everyone alike. Whatever we would do for one would have to be done for the others. If we contacted him, we would have to contact all applicants and give everyone an opportunity for an interview. I indicated that such a procedure would involve the subcommittee members, all of whom were busy people, in an endless round of interviews and confrontations with applicants whose personal concern and anxiety was so great that it would be difficult to maintain objectivity.

At this point my caller seemed satisfied. Our conversation ended amicably, and I urged him to call me again if he wished. As far as I could tell he seemed content to accept the outcome and ready to have another go at it next year.

From a theoretical viewpoint, what does this story demonstrate? First, it shows there is often a complex network of events and procedures that precedes the final distribution of reward. Decision makers have to be selected, the structure of a group decision process has to be decided, and so on. Second, the story demonstrates that the decision makers who control the allocative process, and the individuals who receive reward, readily form cognitive maps of procedural components of the allocative process. Third, the story indicates that an individual readily evaluates the fairness of procedural components, and that such evaluations affect the perceived fairness of the final distribution of reward. If the procedures are seen as fair, then the final distribution is likely to be accepted as fair even though it might be disadvantageous. Fourth, the story suggests that an individual's judgments of fair procedure are influenced by personal self-interest. The receiver whose rewards are low is inclined to doubt the fairness of allocative procedures

and search for flaws in the system that will justify claims for higher reward (cf. Patchen, 1961). Conversely, the decision maker who wants to back up his decisions and protect his position may stongly emphasize that existing procedures are fair.

With respect to the final point about a decision maker seeking to strengthen his position, in thinking back over my phone conversation, it is clear that I attempted to persuade my caller that fair procedures had been used to evaluate his proposal. Without fully realizing it, I presented a series of persuasive messages that manipulated his perception of procedural fairness. But what were the major factors in this influence attempt? It seems there were two. First, I identified several procedural components of the allocative process. They ranged from the process of selecting members of the subcommittee, to the structure of the subcommittee's decision making process. Next, without realizing it, I applied certain implicit standards or rules of fair procedure to these procedural components in order to prove they were fair. The method I chanced on for influencing my caller's perception of procedural fairness contains a simple thoeretical paradigm. This paradigm for analyzing the perception of procedural fairness has two steps. First, the major procedural components in an individual's cognitive map of the allocative process are identified. Then, the justice rules used to evaluate procedural fairness are applied to those components. This paradigm is developed in the following sections.

B. Structural Components in Cognitive Maps of the Allocative Process

An individual develops cognitive maps of the interaction settings and social systems in which he functions. These internal representations of the social environment contain structural elements that correspond to important features of the allocative process. A perceiver may evaluate the fairness of any of these structural elements. The evaluation is based on rules of fair procedure that

are discussed in a later section. The present section focuses on identifying and defining the procedural elements.

It is postulated than an individual may discriminate any of seven categories of procedural components in the sequence of events that culminates in a distribution of reward. The components are selection of agents, setting ground rules, gathering information, decision structure, appeals, safeguards, and change mechanisms. An individual may evaluate the fairness of any of these structural components in his or her cognitive map of the social environment. The perceived components of procedure are defined as follows.

1. Selection of Agents. The sequence of events begins with procedures for choosing the persons or agents who serve as decision makers or information collectors in the allocative process. These individuals may be elected, or selected by higher authorities.

2. Setting Ground Rules. The sequence next involves procedures for informing potential receivers about the nature of available rewards and what must be done to obtain them. Performance goals and evaluation criteria must be defined and communicated to the receivers.

3. Gathering Information. Next come procedures for gathering and utilizing information about the prospective receivers of reward. Before distributing reward, it is usually necessary to evaluate the recipients. For this purpose, reliable information about their behavior must be obtained. In addition, it may be necessary to develop criteria for deciding which types of information constitute usable evidence.

4. Decision Structure. The next set of procedures defines the structure of the final decision process by which reward or punishment is allocated. This factor is especially important in the case of collective allocation decisions because the structure of a group decision process may be quite complex.

A variety of procedural arrangements are possible when decisions are made by a group or committee, or by a succession of individuals located at progressively higher (or lower) levels in the social system.

5. Appeals. Social systems usually have some form of grievance or appeal procedures that give dissatisfied individuals, and their sympathizers, an opportunity to seek redress. They may attempt to modify either the distribution or reward, itself, or actions taken at earlier stages in the allocative process. The appeal procedures may be highly structured and formal, or quite informal.

6. Safeguards. Some procedures serve as safeguards which ensure that agents who administer the allocative process are performing their responsibilities with honesty and integrity. Other procedures deter opportunistic individuals from obtaining rewards or resources by illicit means. In either case, the procedures involve monitoring behavior and applying sanctions when required.

7. Change Mechanisms. A final set of procedures involves methods for changing procedures that regulate the allocative process. The methods for changing procedures may profoundly affect the stability of distribution policies over time, and the possibility of correcting unfair situations.

The seven structural components listed above may be present in an individual's cognitive map of any interaction setting or social system in which rewards, punishments, or resources are distributed. The settings may range from courtrooms in which fines and jail sentances are dispensed; to classrooms in which students are tested and graded; to work situations in which promotions and pay raises are given; to university research award committees which allocate research funds to faculty members. In any of these situations, a perceiver may cognize any of the types of regulatory procedure that are listed above. And each procedural component in the perceiver's cognitive map may become the focus of a judgment process that evaluates the fairness of that procedure.

C. Justice Rules for Evaluating Procedural Fairness

An individual uses justice rules to evaluate the fairness of allocative procedures. In the study of procedural fairness, a justice rule is defined as a belief that allocative procedures are fair when they satisfy certain criteria. This type of justice rule is referred to as a procedural rule to distinguish it from distribution rules that were discussed earlier. The criteria that define the rules of fair procedure can only be guessed at this time because there have been few studies of procedural fairness. However, the view adopted here is that it is better to have speculative statements about such rules than none at all.

Six procedural justice rules are postulated that define criteria which allocative procedures must often satisfy to be perceived as fair. They are the consistency rule, bias-suppression rule, accuracy rule, correctability rule, representativeness rule, and ethicality rule. Because there are few relevant studies, descriptions of organizations by other commentators, and the author's own observations of groups and organizations, constitute the primary evidence for the theoretical proposals.

The following analysis assumes that an individual applies procedural rules selectively and follows different rules at different times. The basic criteria used to evaluate the fairness of procedures change with circumstances. In some situations, one procedural rule may be considered much more relevant than others, in which case judgments of procedural fairness may be dominated by that rule. However, in other situations, several procedural rules may be applicable. The influence of a rule on the individual's judgments of procedural fairness is defined as its weight. If one procedural rule has greater impact than others on judgments of procedural fairness, that rule is said to have greater weight. As with distribution rules, procedural rules may have contradictory implications, or be fully compatible.

In the following analysis, six procedural rules are defined. For each rule, examples are presented which show how that rule is used to evaluate the fairness of the various components of allocative procedure that are listed above. In all, 42 possible combinations can be derived when the seven components of procedure are paired with the six justice rules that are presumed to govern the evaluation of procedural fairness.

1. The Consistency Rule. An individual's judgments of procedural fairness may be based on a consistency rule which dictates that allocative procedures should be consistent across persons and over time. Lack of consistency in procedure may lead an individual to believe that procedural fairness is being violated. When applied across persons, the consistency rule dictates it is necessary to apply similar procedures to all potential recipients of reward, and give special advantage to none. In this form, the rule is closely related to the notion of equality of opportunity.

The rule of consistency across persons may be applied to any of the seven procedural components of the allocative process. For example, in gathering information about job applicants, it would be considered unfair to give persons applying for the same position aptitude tests that differed in difficulty. The rule of consistency across persons also applies to setting ground rules, that is, to procedures that provide potential receivers with information about what must be done to obtain available rewards. For example, a high official of the Energy Research and Development Administration recently attempted to put to rest fears that "inside information" might bias the selection of a site for a new solar energy research institute. To preserve the impression that procedural fairness would be scrupulously maintained, he pledged that "...no citizen or organization is allowed to have a preferred position, or even appear to have knowledge which would give an unfair advantage over any other organization or person..."(Boffey, 1975).

When applied over time, the consistency rule dictates it is necessary to keep procedures stable, at least over the short term. The rule of consistency over time may be applied to any procedural component. For example, it has obvious relevance to change mechanisms that are used to modify allocative procedures. If changes are made too frequently or too easily, the perceived fairness of the allocative process will be reduced. The rule also applies to setting ground rules for performance evaluation. Leaders of work groups must often set performance expectations and specify in advance the criteria for evaluating performance (e.g., Fleishman, Harris, & Burt, 1955; House & Dessler, 1974). The rule of consistency over time suggests that once such standards are established, a sudden or marked deviation from them will be perceived as a violation of fair procedure. Conversely, adherence to established procedures will be seen as fair. Support for this suggestion is found in college students' comments about grading procedures, as revealed in preliminary interviews conducted by Philip Bock, Sheldon Alexander, and the author. A number of students stated it was highly inappropriate for an instructor to abruptly change evaluation procedures that had been agreed on at the beginning of the term. Further support for the suggestion is found in results from a study by Leventhal and Whiteside (1973) in which subjects awarded grades to hypothetical students. When the subjects believed the students had been forewarned that a certain criterion would be used, the students applied that criterion more rigorously.

2. The bias-suppression rule. An individual's judgments of procedural fairness may be based on a bias-suppression rule which dictates that personal self-interest and blind allegiance to narrow preconceptions should be prevented at all points in the allocative process. An individual is likely to believe that procedural fairness is violated when there is unrestrained self-interest or devotion to doctrinaire views.

The role of the bias-suppression rule is evident in practices followed by

study sections of the National Institutes of Health which evaluate research grant proposals. Grant applicants submitted by persons who are members of a study section are never evaluated by that study section. In addition, study section members are required to absent themselves during debate and final vote when the proposal under review has been submitted by a person from their own institution (Gustafson, 1975). These practices involve application of the bias-suppression rule to the selection of agents who administer the allocative process. The procedures maintain fairness by separating decision making roles from personal advocacy. More generally, failure to separate the judicial and adversary roles reduces perceived fairness. For example, many observers would consider it unfair for a union leader accused of violating union rules to sit in judgment of his own guilt or innocence, as often happens (Tannenbaum, 1965). The bias-suppression rule dictates that one should not serve as a judge in one's own case. Similarly, many would doubt the fairness of a situation in which a school board locked in battle with striking teachers held hearings on the teachers' qualifications to teach, and then fired them (Finkin, 1975).

?. The Accuracy Rule. An individual's judgments of procedural fairness may be based on an accuracy rule which dictates it is necessary to base the allocative process on as much good information and informed opinion as possible. Information and opinion must be gathered and processed with a minimum of error.

The accuracy rule may be applied to any procedural component but has especially clear relevance to methods of gathering information about potential receivers of reward. Procedural fairness is violated when performance is evaluated on the basis of inappropriate information, or information provided by incompetent observers (Miner, 1972). For example, students probably believe it is unfair to evaluate them with tests that are either too difficult or too easy. Similarly,

students probably believe it would be unfair if essay tests were graded by an unqualified person. The operation of the accuracy rule is also evident in other social contexts. In industrial settings, most observers would consider it unfair to screen prospective employees with an employment test that did not predict future performance reliably. In the courts, the perceived fairness of the judicial process is probably enhanced by procedures that prohibit the introduction of evidence that is irrelevant and unreliable (Levine, 1974).

The accuracy rule also affects the perceived fairness of other components of allocative procedure. For example, when the selection of agents to administer the allocative process is determined by election, the perceived fairness of the electoral process is probably enhanced when accurate and relevant information about candidates' views and character is available. The accuracy rule is also of great importance with respect to safeguards that deter people from violating fair procedure. Some safeguards help assure that agents who administer the allocative process are performing their duties properly. In such cases, we may speak of accountability which has two aspects, monitoring and sanctions. The integrity of the allocative process is preserved by procedures that detect violations and punish them. Accordingly, the perceived level of fairness will be enhanced when monitoring is accurate and sanctions are effective.

Record keeping is one important method for accurate monitoring of the behavior of agents who control the allocative process. Often, detailed records are kept for inspection by concerned parties. The records may contain facts used as bases of evaluation, e.g., test scores, letters of recommendation, or supervisors' evaluations, or facts about the past distribution of reward that reveal how much was received by various persons. When such records are accurate and honest, they consititute an effective deterrent to wrongdoing because they make it more difficult for violators to escape detection.

Other safeguards help prevent opportunistic persons from obtaining rewards and resources by illicit means such as deception or theft. Persons who want more than the social system can deliver may try to increase their rewards by circumventing normal operating procedures (Leventhal, 1976a). The procedural safeguards that detect and prevent such opportunistic garnering of rewards and resources are diverse, but in all cases, perceived fairness will be enhanced when accurate methods are used to detect violations. For example, during examinations, the presence of attentive proctors probably increases the level of perceived fairness. And, on busy streets, the use of parking meters to detect parking violations probably increases the perceived fairness of penalties.

4. The Correctability Rule. The correctability rule dictates that opportunities must exist to modify and reverse decisions made at various points in the allocative process. Even the most well-intentioned and competent decision makers commit errors or oversights. Consequently, the perceived level of fairness will be increased by the presence of appeal procedures that allow for review and modification of decisions at various stages of the allocative process. A perceiver will attribute greater fairness to groups and organizations that provide legitimate avenues for challenging and overturning decisions. The structure of the appeal procedure may be highly formal, as in courts of law, or informal as when a student complains to an instructor about test grades.

A grievance or appeal procedure often comes into play after the distribution of reward or punishment has been decided. An attempt may be made to directly modify the distribution. However, appeals may also be launched at earlier stages in the allocative process. For example, an individual might wish to challenge the fairness of procedures for gathering information even though the final distribution of rewards has not been decided. Thus, students often complain about the ambiguity of test items before an exam has been scored.

milarly, an individual might challenge the selection of persons who serve as decision makers. Such appeals can take the form of demands for a recount in an election, or complaints about the propriety of an appointment process.

Appeal procedures differ greatly, and the differences may have considerable impact on an individual's perception of procedural fairness. For example, the perceived level of fairness will be reduced when there are barriers that deter dissatisfied individuals from lodging complaints. To be fair, the procedures must be safe and easy to use. Plaintiffs must feel free to lodge an appeal without fear of punishment or retaliation. Procedures that involve long delays, or great expenditure of time, effort, and resources are perceived as less fair.

A final determinant of the perceived fairness of an appeal procedure involves a joint application of the bias-suppression rule and correctability rule. To preserve fairness, the actual processing of an appeal must be unbiased. For example, the appeal should not have to rely on a channel of communication that is dominated by the decision maker whose decision is under challenge. Such a communication channel confounds the judicial and adversary roles. Perceived fairness is reduced unless the original decision maker can be by-passed, and the final judgment rendered by decision makers at higher levels in the social system.

5. The Representativeness Rule. An individual's judgments of procedural fairness may be based on a representativeness rule which dictates that all phases of the allocative process must reflect the basic concerns, values, and outlook of important subgroups in the population of individuals affected by the allocative process. The precise operationalization of this justice rule may vary greatly from one perceiver to the next, depending on which subgroups are considered important. A perceiver's judgments of a subgroup's importance may

be determined by the subgroup's size, prestige, or other factors.

The representativeness rule has obvious relevance for the selection of agents who decide the distribution of reward. The rule requires that decision-making bodies such as committees or legislatures should include representatives of important subgroups in the total population, perhaps, in proportion to the subgroups' prestige and numerical size. The role of the representativeness rule in such cases is shown in Fox and Swazey's (1974) study of kidney dialysis units. The authors describe criteria that were to be used in selecting members of a committee that would draw up nonmedical criteria for deciding which kidney patients would have access to life-saving dialysis machines that were in short supply. One goal was to form a committee that would represent a broad socioeconomic spectrum of the community. In reality, the members chosen were quite homogeneous in socioeconomic background, a fact that ultimately generated considerable debate about the fairness of procedures for deciding who would live and who would die.

The impact of the representativeness rule on the selection of decision makers can also be seen in attempts by federal agencies that award research grants to preserve an image of fairness by broadening the membership of peer review committees. Representativeness has been increased by the importation of reviewers from adjacent disciplines and reviewers not associated with elite universities (Greenberg, 1975). Another indication of the effort to ensure representativeness in the grant review process is the frequent practice of not reappointing reviewers (Gustafson, 1975). The National Institutes of Health policy of rapidly rotating individuals through decision-making positions reduces the likelihood that an unrepresentative clique will excercise control. A high rate of turnover ensures that a broad range of individuals is recruited from the biomedical research community.

The application of the representativeness rule to the selection of agents is also involved in questions of power sharing and participatory decision making. Individuals probably assign greater weight to the rule when their own power is involved. They are likely to attribute greater fairness when they have greater control over the allocative process (Leventhal, 1976b). From an individual's own vantage point, such a situation is fairer because it gives greater representation to a very important individual, namely, himself. In accordance with this assumption, workers believe a pay system is fairer when they have greater control over it (Lawler, 1971). More generally, workers probably attribute greater fairness to allocative procedures when there is genuine participatory decision making and frequent consultation with management (cf. Vroom, 1969). Research on fairness of judicial procedings is also consistent with this suggestion. Defendants attribute greater fairness to trial procedures which give them greater control over the introduction and interpretation of evidence (Thibaut, Walker, LaTour, & Houlden, 1974).

The representativeness rule is also relevant to the question of censorship. Censorship involves restriction on the flow of information. The restriction may occur in any phase of the allocative process, with the result that available information and opinion is no longer representative of the total array that is potentially available. It is proposed that, to the extent an individual believes there is censorship, perceived fairness is reduced.

Censorship may occur in gathering or disseminating information, or in formulating guidelines on the proper use of information as evidence. Certain facts and viewpoints may be suppressed. To the extent that an individual has knowledge of such suppression, the violation of the representativeness rule will reduce perceived fairness. This suggestion is consistent with a recent case in which the editors of a well-known magazine were criticized as unfair for their refusal to publish an article attacking resource allocation policies in the nuclear energy field (Science, 1976). Many other examples of

alleged unfairness in the communications media can be found.

The representativeness rule also applies when censorship exists within the decision structure of a group or committee that decides the distribution of reward. In decision-making groups, there is often a rapid suppression of minority viewpoints, and of opinions that diverge from those of more powerful members. In addition pressure for quick decisions often prevent exploration and consideration of a full range of alternatives (Hoffman 1965; Steiner, 1976). Such tendencies produce a marked restriction in the availability of information and opinion in the group. Much that could be said and should be said is left unstated. Consequently, the range of opinion and information actually presented to the group is unrepresentative of that which is potentially available. In such situations, individuals who recognize that important points of view are being suppressed are likely to attribute lower fairness to the decision process which determines the distribution of reward.

6. The Ethicality Rule. An individual's judgments of procedural fairness may be based on an ethicality rule which dictates that allocative procedures must be compatible with the fundamental moral and ethical values accepted by that individual. Perceived fairness will be reduced when allocative procedures violate personal standards of ethics and morality. When applied to gathering information about potential receivers, the ethicality rule might dictate that methods of observation that involve deception or invade privacy are unfair. Similarly, procedures that involves bribery or spying are seen as unfair (Friedland, Thibaut, & Walker, 1973).

The postulation of an ethicality rule is based on the assumption that judgments of fairness and justice are related to a lager intrapsychic system of moral and ethical values and standards. Linkages between the components of this moral-ethical system are probably quite weak. However, the connections may

often be strong enough for a violation of moral and ethical standards to affect the perception of procedural fairness. For example, an individual who believes that blind obedience to authority is wrong might attribute lower fairness to an allocative procedure that requires such obedience, regardless of the effect of the procedure on the final distribution of reward. Similarly, an individual who believes that deception and trickery are wrong might attribute lower fairness to an allocative procedure that involves such practices, even when the practices do not decrease the fairness of the final distribution of reward.

D. The Relative Weight of Procedural Rules

Six justice rules have been postulated that define criteria an individual may use to evaluate the fairness of allocative procedures. An individual may apply these rules to any of the seven components of allocative procedure. However it is assumed that an individual applies procedural rules selectively and follows different rules at different times. The relative weight of procedural rules may differ from one situation to the next, and one procedural component to the next.

It has been proposed that criteria for judging the fairness of procedures change with circumstances. However, in the absence of research on the determinants of rule weight, only the most general statements can be made about the relative importance of different rules in different situations. For example, it is likely that individuals assign higher weight to procedural rules that favor their own interests. In addition, they probably assign higher weight to procedural rules that are followed by other persons, or favored by legitimate authorities. Another probable determinant of the weight of procedural rules is the perceived level of distributive fairness. An individual who believes existing distributions are fair is likely to support existing procedures, and assign weights to procedural rules that reaffirm the fairness of existing procedures. Conversly, an

individual who believes exisitng distributions are unfair will assign weights to procedural rules tha cast doubt on the fairness of existing procedures and support changing them. Thus, individuals who prefer certain distributions are likely to prefer procedures that generate those distributions, and assign weights to procedural rules on that basis.

The absence of research also makes it difficult to predict the outcome of situations in which several procedural rules receive high weight but have contradictory implications. For example, one can imagine situations in which, for a given individual, the dictates of the representativeness rule clash with the dictates of the accuracy rule. The individual might believe that a numerically important subgroup in the population ought to have direct representation in the decision-making process that controls the distribution of resources, but simultaneously believe that subgroup contains few members qualified to make accurate judgments. To resolve this contradiction between procedural rules, the individual might be forced to chose between having no representatives, or having representatives with modest qualifications. Until more research is available, little can be said about the manner in which an individual resolves such conflicts between procedural rules.

IV. The Impact of Perceived Fairness on Behavior

A. The Importance of Fairness

Equity theory tends to overstate the importance of perceived fairness as a determinant of behavior. Writings in the equity theory tradition convey the impression that an individual's perception of justice is a very powerful determinant of social behavior. In contrast, the position adopted in this paper is that an individual's concern about fairness is only one motivational force among many that affects perception and behavior, and that it is often a weaker force than others. In many situations, most individuals probably give little

thought to questions of fairness (cf. Schwartz, 1968a, 1968b, 1970). To be sure, an individual is usually capable of judging the fairness of distributions and allocative procedures. However, he or she is unlikely to make such judgments continuously, and when such judgments are made, they may not be thorough or precise.

Questions about the importance of perceived fairness necessitate a clearer definition of the theoretical boundaries of the analysis of fairness. An individual's concern for fairness and justice must be viewed as one component within the larger framework of the total pattern of social behavior. To move in this direction, two issues are consiedered in the following sections. The first focuses on situational factors that cause an individual to be concerned about fairness, or indifferent to it. The second issue focuses on the relative potency of concern for fairness as a determinant of behavior, once that concern is aroused.

B. Activation of the Justice Judgment Sequence

This section identifies factors that determine an individual's level of concern about fairness. Four types of determinants are examined. They are the individual's role, the importance of the individual's other goals, the perceived likelihood of rule violation, and the pluralism of normative standards within the social system.

The Effect of Role. An individual may be highly concerned about procedural or distributive fairness because he occupies a social role that has the task of maintaining fairness. The role may involve enforcing an existing set of rules, or proposing solutions to interpersonal disagreements. Such roles include that of judge or juror, sports referee, ombudsman, labor mediator, and others (Leventhal, 1976b). For example, a judge or sports referee sees to it that fair procedures are followed during competetive interaction between adversaries.

In court, or on the playing field, the contest is regulated by a comprehensive set of rules. It is the judge's or referee's duty to interpret and follow these rules, and require the contestants to follow them. Consequently, when enacting their roles, judges, referees, and similar individuals evaluate fairness carefully. They see to it that fair procedures are followed, and that the adversaries' rewards *and* penalties are in line with what is deserved. However, their concern for fairness is likely to be strong primarily when they enact their role. In other settings, they may display no greater concern about fairness than anyone else.

Importance of Other Goals. When preoccupied with goals of greater importance, an individual's concern about fairness is likely to be reduced. The justice judgment sequence may be suppressed because it interferes with more important goals. Such suppression can often be observed when an individual's primary concern is to control the behavior of other persons. One such case occurs when a supervisor is extremely concerned about maximizing workers' performance. Typically, when good performance is important, the contributions rule is favored as a rule of fair distribution. More is given to recipients who contribute more. However, when a supervisor's desire to elicit high performance is exceptionally great, considerations of distributive fairness may be ignored. The supervisor may resort to any strategy that is considered likely to prove effective. For example, Greenberg and Leventhal (in press) placed subjects under strong pressure

motivate failing performers to do better work. The subjects responded by giving higher pay than was deserved based on performance. Furthermore, under some conditions the subjects completely violated the contributions rule. They gave higher reward to failing groups than to successful groups, and higher reward to lazy performers than to well-motivated performers. The subjects who followed this strategy did so because they believed it would maximize productivity. Concern about distributive fairness was completely overshadowed by the need to do what was necessary to elicit better work.

Concern about procedural fairness is often suppressed when an individual is anxious to control the behavior of persons who are believed dangerous. Fair procedures may be ignored in order to protect against threatening individuals. Such suppression of concern for procedural fairness is evident in public attitudes toward civil liberties. In the abstract, there is high public support for freedom of speech and expression, and other rights. However, many individuals favor setting aside these procedural rights in the case of Communists, atheists, or other groups that are considered dangerous to the self, or social order. Procedural rights would be denied to such threatening groups (Erskine & Siegel, 1975; Sears, 1969; Zellman, 1975; Zellman & Sears, 1971).

Concern about procedural fairness may also be minimal when an individual's personal involvement in the social system is low, and the system satisfies the few needs it is supposed to. For example, many members of voluntary organizations expect their organization to satisfy a narrow range of needs, and as long as it satisfies them reasonably well, the members remain indifferent to the organization's method of operation. For example, union members expect their union to bargain collectively for wages and protect them from abuse by supervisors. So long as the union performs these functions adequately, most members remain

indifferent to the details of its operations (e.g., Lipset, Trow, & Coleman, 1956; Tannenbaum, 1965). They view the governance and internal functioning of the union as the province of the leadership, and if leaders execute these tasks without bothering them, so much the better. This indifference to procedural matters may explain why many union members are willing to accept conditions that, from the viewpoint of other observers, appear to involve extensive violations of procedural fairness (Tannenbaum, 1965).

Probability of Violation. An individual is more likely to evaluate the fairness of distributions or allocative procedures when there is reason to suspect that justice rules have been violated. Suspicion of violation may increase when there are large or sudden changes in the distribution of reward, or allocative procedures. Such changes rouse doubts that may activate the justice judgment sequence. Judgments of fairness may also be triggered by complaints or warnings from other persons that fairness is being violated. More generally, the prevailing social climate may create an atmosphere of distrust in social institutions and in the persons who occupy the decision-making roles that regulate the allocative process. Such distrust may be widespread when there have been major scandals in government, business, or politics. Knowledge of Watergate, or secret political funds and payoffs, may elevate an individual's consciousness of distributive and procedural fairness, and heighten skepticism. As Gustafson (1975, p. 1064) suggests, "...in mistrustful times the good faith of all administrators is under suspicion."

An individual's personal experience sometimes provides prima facie evidence of violation of distributive fairness. For example, his or her own rewards may be too low. Such perceived violations of distributive fairness may stimulate an intensive appraisal of the fairness of allocative procedures, especially when the individual is preparing to take corrective action. By finding flaws

in procedure and faulting the system, the individual can justify an appeal for changing the distribution of reward. On the other side of the fence, analogous factors may heighten a decision maker's concern about procedural fairness. The knowledge that disgruntled recipients search for violations of fair procedure stimulates the decision maker to carefully review the fairness of his procedures for distributing rewards and resources. By locating potential violations in advance and correcting them, the administrator strengthens his position and protects against possible criticism. As Greenberg (1975) suggests, the appearance of fairness may be as important as actual fairness. By stressing fair procedure, the decision maker neutralizes adverse reactions to the final distribution of reward.

Monolithic Versus Pluralist Social Systems. An individual's concern about fairness also depends on the extent to which the social system is monolithic and imposes consistent, stable rules of fair procedure and fair distribution. When leaders consistently endorse and legitimize certain rules, fairness will be defined in terms of these rules. More importantly, after a time, existing procedures and distributions are likely to be taken for granted. The fairness of existing arrangments may no longer be evaluated. Consequently, in a monolithic social system, the justice judgment sequence will be activated infrequently.

In a pluralist social system that lacks uniformity, and in which leaders do not require strict adherence to a consistent set of rules, questions of distributive and procedural fairness will be more salient. Competing standards of fairness will be present, and the justice judgment sequence is more likely to be activated. This is probably the case in labor unions that

have a multiparty system of governance. In such pluralist systems, independent and well-established subgroups compete for the members' attention and votes (Lipset, Trow, & Coleman, 1956). Consequently, questions about the fairness of distributional and procedural policies may often be brought to members' attention. Uncritical acceptance of the leadership's views is less likely under these circumstances. In contrast, in monolithic unions which operate with a one-party system, questions about the fairness of union policies are less likely to be raised. A single leadership clique tends to dominate organizational communication channels and suppress competing viewpoints (Lipset, Trow, & Coleman, 1956; Tannenbaum, 1965). Consequently, members are more likely to accept existing procedures and distributions, and not bother to evaluate the fairness of these arrangements.

Under appropriate conditions, even when a social system imposes a monolithic view of the allocative process, some individuals may question the fairness of existing arrangements. This is likely when an individual has experience in other social settings that favor alternative standards of distributive and procedural fairness. For example, consider a family in which parents impose a stable and consistent set of rules. Their view of fairness will prevail and the children will believe that existing procedures and distributions are fair even though, from an external observer's viewpoint, one child may have more advantages than another (Ihinger, 1975). Thus, in families in which monolithic rules govern the allocative process, young children are likely to accept the resulting procedures and distributions without question. However, as a child's range of contacts expands, experience is gained in other social settings, and the conceptions of procedural and distributive fairness that prevail in those settings may be somewhat different from those at home. To the extent that the child internalizes these new rules, the justice judgment sequence is likely to be aroused when the child returns to the family. Procedures and distributions which, heretofore, were accepted uncritically may be subject to searching

evaluation because they are inconsistent with standards newly acquired in other social settings.

C. Concern for Fairness and Other Causes of "Fair" Behavior

Another aspect to questions about the importance of perceived fairness must be considered. Even when the justice judgment sequence is activated, concern about fairness, in its own right, may often have relatively weak effects on behavior. Furthermore, actions that help maintain fairness often arise from motivational forces unrelated to concern for justice. Although a behavior helps contribute to the maintenance of perceived fairness, the concern for fairness may be only a secondary cause of that behavior (Leventhal, 1976a). Ostensibly fair behavior may be caused by motives unrelated to moral or ethical concerns. Consequently, the fairness-restoring effects of an action may be an epiphenomenon, or at least of secondary importance, in the overall pattern of behavior.

Studies of the behavior of decision makers who distribute rewards to others illustrate the preceding point. In such studies, it is often difficult to determine whether the decision maker's behavior is guided by a desire for fairness, a desire to control recipients' behavior, or both factors operating in tandem (Leventhal, 1976a). For example, an allocator who is interested in encouraging good performance usually follows the contributions rule. More is given to better performers. But is the allocator's goal to be fair, or to reward good performance because such a policy encourages high productivity? Similarly, in cohesive groups, allocators often divide rewards equally (Bales, 1950; Lerner, 1974b; Leventhal, Michaels, & Sanford, 1972). But is *this* because they want to be fair, or because they hope that equal allocations will preserve

solidarity? Either or both factors could be involved. In past research, relatively few attempts have been made to separate those portions of an allocator's response which are caused by concern for fairness and justice from those portions which are caused by a desire to manipulate and control recipients' behavior.

The issue raised here is found in equity theory in latent form. In their examination of equity theory, Walster, Berscheid, and Walster (1973) suggest that motivational factors such as retaliation distress (conditioned anxiety) and self-concept distress may underlie the tendency to restore distributive fairness. However, these constructs are never brought into play on the theoretical chessboard. They are merely identified and left standing in place. Basically, the analysis treats the desire for distributive fairness as a motivational force in its own right, without regard to underlying motives that may energize it. The links between concern for fairness, on the one hand, and the self-concept and conditioned anxiety on the other, are not explored. Nor is the possibility raised, as in this paper that concern for fairness may be aroused in parallel with and produce effects superficially similar to those generated by other motivational forces.

A Distinction Between Fair and Quasi-fair Behavior. In future research, it may be useful to distinguish fair behavior that is motivated by a concern for fairness from quasi-fair behavior that is superficially similar but stems primarily from other motivational bases. Quasi-fair behavior resembles fair behavior but is actually different because only fair behavior arises from moral and ethical concerns.

Past research has often failed to distinguish between these two catagories of behavior. However, appropriately designed studies will probably reveal

important differences between them. One approach to this problem is suggested by studies of ingratiation (Jones, 1964) and Machiavellianism (Christie & Geis, 1970). One can readily imagine a type of quasi-fair behavior that is part of a carefully orchestrated strategy for deceiving and manipulating others. Once the deception has been achieved, quasi-fair behavior might rapidly give way to blatant exploitation. Genuinely fair behavior would not. Another approach involves situations in which quasi-fair behavior proves ineffective for obtaining the goals it is designed to acheive. Since quasi-fair behavior is an instrumental rather than moral response, it will be abandoned as readily as any other instrumental response that proves ineffective. In contrast, fair behavior, motivated by genuine concern for fairness and justice, will tend to persist even when more pragmatic goals are not achieved.

To cap off this discussion of the importance of perceived fairness, a word of caution is in order. It has not been the purpose of this section to suggest that an individual's concern for fairness and justice is trivial. The study of social motivation indicates that, under appropriate conditions, any cluster of ideas and beliefs, including beliefs about fairness, can become a major motivational force for the individual (McClelland, 1965; McClelland & Winter, 1969). At a given point in time, an individual may be very concerned about fairness, and this concern may strongly influence behavior. Furthermore, some individuals may be very concerned about fairness in a wide variety of social contexts. For example, a philosopher of ethics, or a psychologist who writes chapters like the one you have just read, may be highly sensitized to questions of perceived fairness. Concern about fairness and justice is not a mere ephiphenomenon that can be stripped away or discarded by reduction to supposedly more basic motives. Nevertheless, concern for fairness may often be a less importnat motive than others. Other goals can override it, or more

subtly, can generate responses that superficially resemble responses that are stimulated by genuine concern for fairness and justice.

V. Summary

Equity theory in its present form has serious limitations as a framework for studying perceived fairness in social relationships. The theory must be incorporated into a larger framework that takes account of problems equity theory does not consider. This paper has proposed such a framework. It was suggested that the perception of fairness is governed by two types of justice rules, distribution rules and procedural rules. Distribution rules dictate that rewards, punishments, and resources should be allocated in accordance with certain criteria. For example, a contributions rule dictates that recipients with better performance should receive higher reward; a needs rule dictates that recipients with greater need should receive higher reward; and an equality rule dictates that rewards should be divided equally. The relative importance of these distribution rules, and others, changes from one situation to the next. The weights assigned to them depend on the social setting, and the individual's role in that setting.

A multistage justice judgment sequence was postulated in which an individual assigns weights to distribution rules, then estimates recipients' deservingness based on each applicable rule, and then uses the rule-combination equation to combine the separate estimates into a final judgment of fair distribution. A separate information-processing subroutine is used for each rule to estimate deservingness based on that rule. In this model of the justice judgment process, the core equation of equity theory is used to describe the information-processing subroutine for judgments of fairness based on contributions.

An individual evaluates not only distributions of reward, but also the mechanisms in the social system that generate those distributions. A complex sequence of procedures often precedes the final distribution of reward, and an individual usually develops a cognitive map of the allocative process. Any component in this cognitive map may become the focus of a judgment sequence that evaluates procedural fairness. For example, an individual may evaluate the fairness of methods for selecting decision makers who control the allocative process; methods of gathering information about potential recipients of reward; or methods for changing existing procedures. The fairness of such practices is evaluated with procedural rules which dictate criteria that allocative procedures must satisfy to be fair. For example, fairness may be judged in terms of a procedure's consistency over time and across persons; its accuracy and prevention of personal bias; or its representativeness of the values, interests, and outlook of important subgroups in the population of persons affected by the allocative process. The relative importance of different procedural rules probably changes from one situation to the next. However, little is known about the determinants of the relative weight of procedural rules.

The conceptual analysis of procedural fairness remains speculative because most research has focused on the problem of fair distribution. However, the present analysis affords an opportunity to apply the concept of procedural fairness in laboratory and field studies of issues such as censorship, participatory decision making, equal opportunity, and the representativeness of social institutions.

An individual's concern for fairness and justice represent only one component in the total stucture of behavior and personality. Consequently, he or she may often be unconcerned about fairness. The justice judgment sequence may not be activated because the individual is absorbed by more important goals, or

for other reasons. Even when concern for justice is aroused, the perceived fairness of procedures and distributions may have modest impact on behavior. Moreover, behavior that helps preserve fairness is often stimulated by motivational forces unrelated to moral or ethical concerns. The behavior may be more an instrumental response motivated by pragmatic concerns, than a moral response motivated by genuine concern for fairness and justice. However, while concern for fairness may have less impact on behavior than some other motives, such concern is not an epiphenomenon that is reducible to supposedly more basic motives. Concern for fairness and justice can be a powerful motivational force in its own right, and perceived fairness may have important effects on behavior.

REFERENCES

Adams, J.S. Toward an understanding of inequity. Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 1963, 67, 422-436.

Adams, J.S. Inequity in social exchange. In L. Berkowitz (Ed.), Advances in experimental social psychology, Vol.2. New York: Academic Press, 1965, Pp. 267-299.

Adams, J.S., & Freedman, S. Equity theory revisited: Comments and annotated bibliography. In L. Berkowitz & E. Walster (Eds.), Advances in experimental social psychology, Vol. 9. New York: Academic Press, 1976. Pp. 43-90.

Anderson, N.H. Cognitive algebra: Integration theory applied to social attribution. In L. Berkowitz (Ed.) Advances in experimental social psychology, Vol. 7. New York: Academic Press, 1974, Pp. 1-101.

Bales, R. F. Interaction process analysis: Cambridge, Mass.: Addison-Wesley. 1950.

Berger, J., Zelditch, M., Anderson, B., & Cohen, B. P. Structural aspects of distributive justice: A status value formulation. In J. Berger, M. Zelditch, & B. Anderson (Eds.), Sociological theories in progress, Vol. 2. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1972. Pp. 119-146.

Berkowitz, L., & Walker, N. Laws and moral judgments. Sociometry, 1967, 30, 410-422.

Blau, P.M. Exchange and power in social life. New York: John Wiley, 1964.

Boffey, P.M. Energy research: A harsh critique says federal effort may backfire. Science, 1975, 190, 535-537.

Burnstein, E., & Zajonc, R.B. The effect of group success on the reduction of status incongruence in task-oriented groups. Sociometry, 1965, 28, 349-362.

Christie, R., & Geis, F.L. Studies in machiavellianism. New York: Academic Press, 1970.

Deutsch, M. Equity , equality, and need: What determines which value will be used as the basis for distributive justice? Journal of Social Issues, 1975, 31, 137-149.

Erskine, H., & Siegel, R. L. Civil liberties and the American public. Journal of Social Issues, 1975, 31, 13-29.

Finkin, M.W. A judge in one's own case? Academe, 1975, 9, 8.

Fleishman, E.A., Harris, E. F., & Burtt, H. E. Leadership and supervision in industry. Columbus, Ohio: Bureau of Educational Research, Ohio State University, 1955.

Fox, R.C., & Swazey, J. P. The courage to fail: A social view of organ transplants and dialysis. Chicago, Ill.: University of Chicago Press, 1974.

Friedland, N., Thibaut, J., & Walker, L. Some determinants of the violation of rules. Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 1973, 3, 103-118.

Goodman, P.S., & Friedman, A. An examination of Adams' theory of inequity. Administrative Science Quarterly, 1971, 16, 271-288.

Greenberg, D.S. Peer review under fire. Science Digest, 1975, 78, 77-78.

Greenberg, J., & Leventhal, G. S. Equity and the use of overreward to motivate performance. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, in press.

Gustafson, T. The controversy over peer review. Science, 1975, 190, 1060-1066.

Harris, R. J. Handling negative inputs: On the plausible equity formulae. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 1976, 12, 194-209.

Hoffman, L. R. Group problem solving. In L. Berkowitz (Ed.), Advances in experimental social psychology, Vol. 2. New York: Academic Press, 1965. Pp. 99-132.

Homans, G. C. Social behavior: Its elementary forms. (Rev. Ed.) New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1974.

House, R. J., & Dessler, G. The path-goal theory of leadership: Some post hoc and a priori tests. In J.G. Hunt, & L.L.Larson (Eds.), Contingency approaches to leadership. Carbondale, Ill.: Southern Illinios University Press, 1974. Pp. 29-55.

Ihinger, M. The referee role and norms of equity: A contribution toward a theory of sibling conflict. Journal of Marraige and the Family, 1975, 37, 515-524.

Jones, B. D., & Kaufman, C. The distribution of urban public services: A preliminary model. Adminstration and Society, 1974, 6, 337-360.

Jones, E. E. Ingratiation: A social psychological analysis. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1964.

Karuza, J., & Leventhal, G. S. Justice judgments: Role demands and the perception of fairness. Paper presented at the meeting of the American Psychological Association, Washington D. C., September, 1976.

Kaufmann, H. Legality and harmfulness of a bystander's failure to intervene as determinants of moral judgment. In J. Macaulay & L. Berkowitz (Eds.), Altruism and helping behavior. New York: Academic Press, 1970. Pp. 77-81.

Komorita, S. S., & Chertkoff, J. M. A bargaining theory of coalition formation. Psychological Review, 1973, 80, 149-162.

Lawler, E. E. Pay and organizational effectiveness: A psychological view. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1971.

Lerner, M.J. Observer's evaluation of a victim: Justice, guilt, and veridical perception. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1971, 20, 127-135.

Lerner, M. Social psychology of justice and interpersonal attraction. In T. L. Huston (Ed.), Foundations of interpersonal attraction. New York: Academic Press, 1974. Pp. 331-351. (a)

Lerner, M. J. The justice motive: "Equity" and "parity" among children. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1974, 29, 539-550. (b)

Leventhal, G. S. The distribution of rewards and resources in groups and organizations. In L. Berkowitz & E. Walster (Eds.), Advances in experimental social psychology. Vol. 9. New York: Academic Press, 1976. Pp. 91-131. (a)

Leventhal, G. S. Fairness in social relationships. In J. W. Thibaut, J. T. Spence, & R. C. Carson (Eds.), Contemporary topics in social psychology. Morristown, N. J.:General Learning Press, 1976. Pp. 211-239. (b)

Leventhal, G. S., Michaels, J. W., & Sanford, C. Inequity and interpersonal conflict: Reward allocation and secrecy about reward as methods of preventing conflict. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1972, 23, 88-102.

Leventhal, G. S., & Whiteside, H. D. Equity and the use of reward to elicit high performance. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1973, 25, 75-83.

Levine, M. Scientific method and the adversary model: Some preliminary thoughts. American Psychologist, 1974, 29, 661-677.

Lewis, S. A., & Leventhal, G. S. Professors' and Lawyers' preference for merit pay: The effect of scarcity, perceived control and social role. In press.

Lipset, S. M., Trow, M. A., & Coleman, J. S. Union democracy and secondary organization. In W. Petersen (Ed.), American social patterns. Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1956. Pp. 171-218.

McClelland, D.C. Toward a theory of motive acquisition. American Psychologist, 1965, 20, 321-333.

McClelland, D.C., & Winter, D.G. Motivating economic achievement. New York: Free Press, 1969.

Miner, J. B. Management appraisal: A review of procedures and practices. In H. L. Tosi, R. J. House, & M.D. Dunnette (Eds.), Managerial motivation and compensation. East Lansing, Mich.: Michigan State University Business Studies, 1972. Pp. 412-428.

Parsons, T. The social system. New York:Free Press, 1951.

Parsons, T., Shils, E. A., & Olds, J. Values, motives, and systems of action. In T. Parsons & E.A. Shils (Eds.), Toward a general theory of action. New York: Harper & Row, 1951. Pp. 45-275.

Patchen, M. The choice of wage comparisons. Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, 1961.

Pondy, L. R. Toward a theory of internal resource-allocation. In M. N. Zald (Ed.), Power in organizations. Nashville, Tenn.: Vanderbilt University Press, 1970. Pp. 270-311.

Pritchard, R. D. Equity theory: A review and critique. Organizational Behavior and Human Performance, 1969, 4, 176-211.

Pruitt, D. G. Indirect communication and the search for agreement in negotiation. Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 1971, 1, 205-239.

Pruitt, D. G. Methods for resolving differences of interest: A theoretical analysis. Journal of Social Issues, 1972, 28, 133-154.

Rawls, J. A theory of justice. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1971.

Sampson, E. E. Status congruence and cognitive consistency. Sociometry, 1963, 26, 146-162.

Sampson, E. E. Studies of status congruence. In L. Berkowitz (Ed.), Advances in experimental social psychology, Vol. 4. New York: Academic Press, 1969. Pp. 225-270.

Samuel, W. Suggested amendments to "new directions in equity research", Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 1976, 2, 36-39. (a)

Samuel, W. In further support of the Adams ratio: A reply to Dr. G. William Walster. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 1976, 2, 45-46. (b)

Schwartz, S. H. Words, deeds, and the perception of consequences and responsibility in action situations. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1968, 10, 232-242. (a)

Schwartz, S. H. Awareness of consequences and the influence of moral norms on interpersonal behavior. Sociometry, 1968, 31, 355-369. (b)

Schwartz, S. H. Moral decision making and behavior. In J. Macaulay & L. Berkowitz (Eds.), Altruism and helping behavior. New York: Academic Press, 1970. Pp. 127-141.

Science. Nuclear foes fault Scientific American's editorial judgment in publishing a recent article by Nobel laureate Hans Bethe. 1976, 191, 1248-1249.

Sears, D. O. Political behavior. In G. Lindzey & E. Aronson (Eds,), The handbook of social psychology, Vol. 5. (2nd ed.) Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1969. Pp. 315-458.

Steiner, I. D. Task-performing groups. In J. W. Thibaut, J. T. Spence, & R. C. Carson (Eds.), Contemporary topics in social psychology. Morristown, N.J.:General Learning Press, 1976. Pp. 393-422.

Tannenbaum, A. S. Unions. In J. G. March (Ed.), Handbook of organizations. Chicago, Ill.: Rand McNally, 1965. Pp. 710-763.

Thibaut, J., Friedland, N., & Walker, L. Compliance with rules: Some social determinants. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1974, 30, 792-801.

Thibaut, J.W., & Kelley, H. H. The social psychology of groups. New York: Wiley, 1959.

Thibaut, J., Walker, L., LaTour, S., & Houlden, P. Procedural justice as fairness. Stanford Law Review , 1974, 26, 1271-1289.

Vroom, V. H. Industrial social psychology. In G. Lindzey & E. Aronson (Eds.), The handbook of social psychology. Vol. 5. (2nd ed.) Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1969. Pp. 196-268.

Walker, L., LaTour, S., Lind, E. A., & Thibaut, J. Reactions of participants and observers to modes of adjudication. Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 1974, 4, 295-310.

Walster, E., Berscheid, E., & Walster, G. W. New directions in equity research. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1973, 25, 151-176.

Walster, G. W. The Walster et al.(1973) formula: A correction. Representative Research in Social Psychology, 1975, 6, 65-67.

Walster, G. W. Reply to Dr. William Samuel: Suggested amendements to new directions in equity research. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 1976, 2, 40-44.

Weiner, B., Frieze, I.,Kukla, A., Reed, L., Rest, S., & Rosenbaum, R. M. Perceiving the causes of success and failure. New York: General Learning Press, 1971.

Yuchtman, E. Reward structure, the quality of work environment, and social accounting. In M. Dierkes & R.A. Bauer (Eds.), Corporate social accounting. New York: Praeger, 1973, Pp. 183-190.

Zellman, G. L. Antidemocratic beliefs: A survey and some explanations. Journal of Social Issues, 1975, 31, 31-53.

Zellman, G. L., & Sears, D. O. Childhood origins of tolerance for dissent. Journal of Social Issues, 1971, 27, 109-136.

Zuckerman, M. A comment on the equity formula by Walster, Berscheid, and Walster (1973). Representative Research in Social Psychology, 1975, 6, 63-64.